Conflict dossier · #117 of 120
M23 / Congo conflict resurgence, DRC (2022–present)
21st Century & Ongoing Tier 2
M23 / Congo conflict resurgence, DRC (2022–present)
Status: ongoing armed conflict, as of the September 2026 observation window.
Overview
- Belligerents: Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) with allied Wazalendo militias, the UN MONUSCO peacekeeping mission, and — in 2023–2024 — a SADC mission (SAMIDRC, withdrawn 2025). Burundian troops have also operated in the east. Versus: the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group and its political arm the Congo River Alliance (AFC); numerous other armed groups (CODECO, ADF, FDLR, Zaire, Nyatura factions) operate in Ituri and the Kivus as separate conflicts.
- Dates: M23 resurgence from late 2021; major offensive from March 2022; capture of Goma January 2025. Ongoing.
- Theater: North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, eastern DRC — Goma, Bukavu, Masisi, Rutshuru, Walikale, Minova.
Causes (attributed)
- M23's stated grievances: non-implementation of the 2013 Nairobi agreements (demobilization, refugee return) and the protection of Congolese Tutsi communities — M23/AFC claims (attributed).
- The DRC government frames M23 as a Rwandan proxy pursuing plunder of eastern Congo's minerals; President Tshisekedi has accused Rwanda of "expansionist" aggression (attributed). Rwanda denies supporting M23 (attributed denial) — but ICG reports that "foreign diplomats broadly acknowledge Rwandan backing," and UN Group of Experts reports have documented Rwandan support (attributed to UN/ICG reporting).
- Analysts attribute the conflict's persistence to: the Congolese state's weakness in the east; competition over coltan, gold and tin revenues; and the unresolved FDLR issue (Rwanda's stated security concern — attributed).
Course
M23 re-emerged in late 2021 and launched a major offensive in March 2022, seizing Bunagana and large parts of Rutshuru. Regional diplomacy (Nairobi, Luanda processes) and an EAC force failed to halt the advance; the EAC force withdrew in late 2023, replaced by SAMIDRC. In late 2024–January 2025 M23 — with reported Rwandan support — overran Goma (North Kivu's capital), then Bukavu (South Kivu) in February 2025. The UN reported nearly 3,000 deaths in the Goma fighting. In mid-2025 Qatar mediated talks and the US brokered a DRC–Rwanda peace framework (June 2025); M23 did not disarm. As of 2026 M23/AFC administers large parts of the Kivus while Kinshasa, Kigali and mediators trade accusations.
Casualties (attributed)
- ~3,000 killed in the capture of Goma (January 2025) — UN reporting (OCHA/UN officials via press).
- No consolidated conflict-wide death toll for the 2022–2026 M23 resurgence exists in sources consulted — UNVERIFIED as a total. (The broader eastern-DRC violence, including Ituri/ADF/FDLR conflicts, has killed thousands more per UN/ACLED reporting — precise consolidated figure UNVERIFIED.)
- Hundreds of thousands displaced in the 2024–2025 offensives (UN OCHA; exact September 2026 figure UNVERIFIED).
Current status (as of September 2026)
- Active: M23/AFC holds Goma, Bukavu and much of the Kivus; no disarmament; Doha/Qatari mediation and the US-backed framework have not ended the rebellion (press reporting through 2026).
- MONUSCO remains deployed but politically contested; SAMIDRC withdrew in 2025.
- The Rwandan-backing question remains the central attribution dispute: UN experts and ICG-briefed diplomats affirm it; Rwanda denies it (both attributed).
Tracker pulse
- UN (MONUSCO, Group of Experts, OCHA): primary institutional source — Goma death toll, displacement, Rwanda-support documentation.
- ICG/CrisisWatch: analytical tracking; the diplomat-consensus line on Rwandan backing.
- ACLED: event-level data for eastern DRC (consolidated 2022–2026 M23 toll not retrieved — UNVERIFIED detail).
- UCDP: codes DRC's overlapping conflicts (detail not directly retrieved).
- Debate: Rwandan support (denied by Kigali, documented by UN experts); civilian-harm attribution in Goma/Bukavu (both sides blame each other — UNVERIFIED).
Validation tier
Tier 2 — strong institutional corroboration (UN, ICG, MONUSCO) of the conflict's course and the Goma toll; no multi-tracker consolidated fatality total retrieved.
UNVERIFIED points
- Conflict-wide death toll for the 2022–2026 M23 resurgence.
- Rwandan support: documented by UN experts but denied by Rwanda — the strongest available evidence is attributed, not independently verified by this pass.
- Current control map and displacement totals as of September 2026.
- Status of Doha/Qatari mediation outcomes.
Sources
- UN reporting via press (2025): ~3,000 killed in Goma capture
- International Crisis Group: foreign diplomats broadly acknowledge Rwandan backing for M23; Rwanda denies
- UN Group of Experts reporting on Rwandan support (via press/ICG summaries)
- M23 capture of Goma (Jan 2025) and Bukavu (Feb 2025): widely reported, corroborated
Images
Sources
- UN reporting via press (2025): ~3,000 killed in Goma capture
- International Crisis Group: foreign diplomats broadly acknowledge Rwandan backing for M23; Rwanda denies
- UN Group of Experts reporting on Rwandan support (via press/ICG summaries
- M23 capture of Goma (Jan 2025) and Bukavu (Feb 2025): widely reported, corroborated