Conflict dossier · #113 of 120
Oromo conflict, Ethiopia (2018–present)
21st Century & Ongoing Tier 2
Oromo conflict, Ethiopia (2018–present)
Status: ongoing armed conflict, as of the September 2026 observation window.
Overview
- Belligerents: Ethiopian federal government and Oromia regional security forces (Ethiopian National Defense Force, federal police, Oromia regional militias). Versus: the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) — breakaway armed wing of the Oromo Liberation Front, operating mainly in western and southern Oromia; also Amhara militias (Fano) and Benishangul-Gumuz militias involved in cross-cutting violence in western Oromia. Intercommunal violence (Oromo–Amhara) is entangled with the insurgency.
- Dates: OLA insurgency from 2018 (after the OLF split on return from exile under Abiy Ahmed's reforms); intensified from 2019. Ongoing.
- Theater: Oromia region, Ethiopia — especially western Oromia (Wollega zones, Kellem Wollega, Horo Guduru, Illubabor) and pockets of North Shewa, Arsi, and Guji zones.
Causes (attributed)
- The OLA frames its fight as resistance to what it calls Oromo political and economic marginalization under successive Ethiopian governments, including Abiy Ahmed's administration (OLA statements via Addis Standard).
- The Ethiopian government frames the OLA as a terrorist organization responsible for massacres of civilians (notably Amhara civilians in western Oromia) and rejects political-grievance framing (government statements via state media and AP).
- Analysts (Rift Valley Institute, March 2025) attribute persistence to: the failed 2023 peace talks (two rounds, November 2023, ended without agreement); competition over land and resources; the OLA's entrenchment in western Oromia; and the government's reliance on military crackdowns that, activists argue, deepen Oromo resentment (attributed to activists and analysts — contested by the government).
Course
After the OLF's 2018 return from exile, its armed wing split into the OLA under Jaal Marroo. Clashes with federal forces began in 2019 and escalated; the OLA allied tactically with the TPLF during the 2021–2022 Tigray war advance on Addis Ababa. Peace talks in 2023 (Tanzania/Nairobi rounds) failed twice. Violence since has been a grinding pattern: OLA ambushes and assassinations (including of local officials), government offensives, and mass-casualty attacks on civilians — notably against Amhara communities in western Oromia, with the June 2022 Gimbi-area massacre (eyewitnesses reported 200+ killed; the government blamed the OLA, the OLA blamed government militias — UNVERIFIED attribution) and repeated 2025–2026 incidents. In September 2026, fresh ethnic clashes in western Oromia killed dozens, with the Oromia regional government blaming the OLA and the OLA's spokesman Odaa Tarbii blaming retreating government/militia forces (AP via Africa Global Village — both claims attributed).
Casualties (attributed)
- 3,792 fatalities from 1,577 political-violence events in Oromia during 2024–2025 — ACLED data compiled by CPIT/Country Policy and Information Team (via ecoi.net, ETH CPIN report): 2,400 fatalities in 2024, 1,392 in 2025. (Covers all political violence in Oromia, not only OLA-related.)
- Q1 2025: 119 incidents, 174 killed in Oromia — ACLED via ACCORD (ecoi.net).
- November 2025: 50+ civilians killed in attacks — Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (via Africa Global Village).
- September 2026: dozens killed in western Oromia ethnic clashes — eyewitness/AP reporting (UNVERIFIED exact toll; one resident claimed 230 bodies — UNVERIFIED).
- No consolidated 2018–present death toll exists in sources consulted; the conflict is widely described as "underreported."
Current status (as of September 2026)
- Active and described by The Reporter (May 2025) as "embroiled in an underreported conflict" with widespread civilian casualties, mass displacement, and deepening humanitarian crisis.
- No peace process active after the November 2023 talks collapse (UNVERIFIED whether new talks are planned).
- Attribution of civilian massacres remains fiercely contested between the government and the OLA — a core honesty constraint for this dossier.
Tracker pulse
- ACLED: the primary quantitative source (Oromia event/fatality data via CPIT and ACCORD compilations).
- Rift Valley Institute (March 2025): western Oromia conflict-trend analysis.
- EHRC / Addis Standard: incident-level reporting.
- UCDP: codes Oromia/OLA violence within Ethiopia's non-state conflict data (detail not directly retrieved).
- Debate: whether the OLA is a coherent insurgency or a fragmented set of armed groups (analysts note it numbers in the thousands and lacks heavy weaponry — Pinnacle Gazette via EHRC); and who perpetrates civilian massacres.
Validation tier
Tier 2 — ACLED data plus RVI analysis, EHRC, and multi-outlet reporting converging on an active, underreported conflict; attribution of specific atrocities single-source/contested.
UNVERIFIED points
- Consolidated death toll since 2018.
- Perpetrators of the Gimbi-area massacre and subsequent civilian attacks (government and OLA blame each other; no independent adjudication retrieved).
- OLA's strength, structure, and degree of central command.
- September 2026 casualty claims (eyewitness counts UNVERIFIED).
- Whether any new peace talks are planned.
Sources
- https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2138312/ETH_CPIN_Oromos__OLF_and_OLA.pdf (CPIT/ETH CPIN: ACLED 2024–2025 Oromia data, 3,792 fatalities; RVI analysis; The Reporter May 2025)
- https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2129159/2025q1Ethiopia_en.pdf (ACCORD: Q1 2025, 119 incidents/174 killed in Oromia)
- https://www.africaglobalvillage.com/ethnic-clashes-kill-dozens-in-ethiopia/ (AP: September 2026 western Oromia clashes; competing attribution)
- https://addisstandard.com/ola-blames-government-proxies-for-recent-killings-in-arsi-accuses-the-ruling-party-of-fueling-new-conflict/ (OLA statement; Nov 2023 talks failure)
- https://www.africaglobalvillage.com/ethiopia-more-than-50-civilians-killed-in-november-attacks/ (EHRC: 50+ civilians killed, November 2025)